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AFRICAN UNION, STATE-BUILDING AND 




 The trajectory of African development since its decade of independ-
ence tends to be a contradictory admixture of hope and despair. Undoubted-
ly, political independence came with great expectations which were hinged 
on the dialectical permutation that the collapse of colonialism would usher 
in an epoch of unhindered national development. But that hope was quickly 
transformed into despair as African states became embroiled in all manner 
of socio-economic and political contradictions, thus occupying the “bottom of 
global development and poverty scale, with human conditions largely mov-
ing backwards” (Odukoya 2018, 174). The early attempt at institutionalising 
African unity was under the auspices of the Organisation of African unity 
(OAU) (now African Union, AU). Scholars are of the opinion that OAU was 
successful in actualizing the dismantling of colonialism and apartheid but in-
effective in motorising the integration of African states and steering them to 
sustainable development (Packer and Rukare 2002; Ibeike-Jonah 2001; Bek-
erie 2001).
African statehood has been at a crossroads, mainly as a result of cen-
trifugal forces that tug at its cohesiveness. Majority of African countries are 
categorised as fragile or failed states. The general challenge of fragility is cap-
tured by OECD (2016, 24) thus, “over 1.6 billion people, or 22% of the global 
population, currently live in … fragile contexts. Population in these fragile 
contexts is anticipated to increase to 3 billion people, or 32% of the global 
population, by 2050.” Of particular challenge is that African states dominate 
the list of fragile states. For instance, out of 47 countries identified as fragile 
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states in 2012, 28 of them were African states, thus making over half of Afri-
can states fragile (OECD 2012). Even more alarming are current data on state 
fragility as at 2016: out of 56 fragile contexts examined and measured under 
the OECD’s fragility framework, 35 are in sub-Saharan Africa (OECD 2016).  
Despite the divergences in the conceptualization state fragility in both 
donor and academic circles (Olowu and Chanie 2016), this paper adopts the 
OECD definition which recognises the universality and multidimensionality 
of fragility by its harmonization of the parameters in divergent definitions. 
The OECD definition identifies and measures five dimensions of fragility 
namely economic, environmental, political, security and societal. Thus, with-
in the context of these dimensions, state fragility connotes “the combination 
of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/
or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead 
to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, dis-
placement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies.” (OECD 2016, 22). 
The fragility of African states is linked to the mismanagement of 
opportunities by the emergent post-independence leaders and sustained 
afterwards by piratic and roguish political class riding on the wings of au-
thoritarianism (Ahluwalia 2001). These leaders failed to facilitate structural, 
institutional and governance reforms that could have set the stage for the 
proper take-off of African statehood. Instead of state-building, they embarked 
upon nation-building, thus turning the potential advantage of ethnic hetero-
geneity, which characterised almost all African states, into a curse (Nzongo-
la-Ntalaja 1999; Green 2011). 
The recourse of African leaders to primordial and neopatrimonial ties 
as basis for solidarity was part of their strategies to hold onto political power 
whose utilitarian value consisted of its guarantee of access to state resources 
(Otunnu 2018; Ake 1981). The parochialism of exclusionary politics as basis 
for solidarity not only resuscitated the psyche of resistance as marginalised 
ethnic groups fought for inclusion but also resulted in social fragmentation 
and the de-legitimization of the state.
 This paper problematizes state fragility in Africa tracing its roots to 
the serial failures of successive African leaderships to transform the colonial 
state, massive exploitation of the state by opportunistic elite and connivance 
of local elites with external forces (Otunnu 2018; Sigman and Lindberg 2017) 
and the seeming inaction of the AU with reference to its constitutive act. 
The paper contends that the relevance of AU in the overall architecture of re-
versing the contemporary fragility of African states lies in the single-minded 
expansion of its institutional and structural capability to meet its objectives on 
the economic, political and security fronts as avowed in the vision and spirit 
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of its constitutive act.
Theorising Statehood in Africa: Going Back to the Basics
 Contemporary statehood in Africa is a product of centuries of con-
tact and formal political domination by European states. The foundation of 
statehood in Africa did not follow the patterns of state formation that un-
derpinned the emergence of states in Europe (Herbst 2000). Rather, states 
emerged in Africa according to the imperial interests of the European states. 
The conference, which was convened in Berlin in 1884-5 laid the ground rules 
for the partition of Africa (Gbenenye 2016; Griffiths 1986). Even though the 
partitioning of Africa was the agenda of the conference, African representa-
tives were not in attendance and the ‘triumphant’ imperial powers neglected 
to organise referenda across the artificially-banded states to determine their 
support or otherwise. Thus, the conference was a European platform to share, 
among competing European powers, the continent of Africa as if it were a 
chattel (Gbenenye 2016; Igwe 2002; Okafor 2000). The exclusionary nature 
of state creation in Africa marginalised its people and resulted in lack of mo-
tivation to preserve and nurture the inherited states even after independence. 
The emergence of state system often coincides with voluntary agree-
ment of the people to found a socio-political entity. Such “founding” often 
entails the dismantling of the old social order and the erection of a new one 
in its stead. As Nnoli (2003, 14) asserts, “by the emergence of a new state we 
mean the coming into position of control of state power by a new ruling class 
at the expense of the old ruling class.” But such a state must derive its essence 
and legitimacy from the people. Although the scramble for Africa by the Eu-
ropeans led to the dethronement of the indigenous social order, it essentially 
lacked the support of the people. This essential condition of state formation 
which was neither fulfilled by the imperial powers nor rectified by the emer-
gent African leaders after independence is amongst the factors that tend to 
haunt Africa’s state system (Okafor 2000). 
The retention of the colonial states by the emergent African leaders 
was a manifestation of their failure to recognise the incongruity of the inher-
ited colonial state system to the future of independent Africa. Apart from the 
motives that spawned the emergence of colonial states, which were narrow 
and detrimental to the indigenous African people, these states had attributes 
that decidedly narrowed their viability. As Griffiths (1986); Easterly & Levine 
(1997) point out, European  colonialism lumped together people of diverse 
cultures and traditions, created arbitrary geographical boundaries that were 
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in grotesque shapes and varied sizes and evolved state entities that were either 
small and economically unviable or large and unwieldy and as such ungov-
ernable. 
At the root of the contemporary crisis associated with state-building in 
Africa is the reliance of African leaders on faulty foundation of state system to 
drive statehood. This faulty foundation underpins the illusionary character of 
African states (Jackson and Rosberg 1986). The illusions of African statehood 
consist of the disconnect between it and the prevailing notion of the state in 
modern political, legal, and social theory as well as the experiential difference 
in the trajectory of state development between Europe, which is seen as a 
model, and Africa (Jackson and Rosberg 1986; Rotberg 2004; Akude 2009). 
Although the concept of state is contested by scholars on account of lack of ex-
clusive attributes that differentiate it from other socio-political organizations, 
it ordinarily incorporates such referents as independent political structure of 
sufficient authority and power to govern, a defined territory, population and 
external recognition (Jackson and Rosberg 1986; Clapham 2002). As a result 
of the deviation of African states from the European model, such terms as 
“monopoly state,” “shadow state,” “quasi state,” “juridical state,” and “devel-
opmental state” among others have been used to characterise them (Otunnu 
2018; Akude 2009; Clapham 2002). All these descriptive concepts depict Af-
rican states as lacking the capabilities of sovereignty necessary for effective 
exercise of power and authority.
The dilemma of postcolonial African statehood is that most states 
failed even before they were formed (Englebert and Tull 2007). The manifesta-
tion of this failure is encapsulated in the various dimensions of contradictions 
that beset African states immediately after political independence. A checklist 
of these contradictions spans the broad spectrum of development challenges 
and range from the distorted postcolonial dreams of inclusive development, 
violent conflicts, pervasive poverty, political instability and incapacity to im-
plement policies to institutional weakness among others (Clapham 2002; 
Ahluwalia 2001; Jones, De Oliveira and Verhoeven 2013). There is tendency 
among scholars to view postcolonial African states as successor to, rather than 
continuation of, the colonial states. Such theoretical postulations discount the 
role of the erstwhile imperial powers in spawning and deepening the con-
tradictions of African statehood or enthroning what scholars have variously 
termed the “African developmental crisis” or “African tragedy” (Smith 2006; 
Leys 1994). Rather, some anchor the crisis of statehood in Africa on predatory 
theory, which regards the state as an agent of particular groups, and situate 
leadership failure as a necessary manifestation of the predation (North 1981; 
Clapham 2002). And others conceptualise it within the ambit of actor-net-
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work theory and thus approximate the crisis of statehood in Africa to material 
contradictions or “consequence of the absence of the physical infrastructure 
that is constitutive of modern government” (Schouten 2013). Oloruntoba & 
Falola (2018) and Omeje (2016) have pointed out these characterizations tend 
to obfuscate the role of external forces in shaping and contributing to the 
dysfunctionality of the state in Africa. A most obvious of these contributions 
was the manipulation by the colonial powers which raised the crop of leaders 
that took over leadership at independence and created links that consolidated 
post-independence relationships with them (Onimode 1983; Ake 1981). 
The crisis that enveloped African states shortly after independence 
was an extension of popular opposition that had trailed colonialism. Because 
the post-independence African elite carried on with governance without any 
form of an overhaul of the inherited state system, and also proceeded to treat 
it in terms of business as usual, the resistance that characterised colonial rule 
was transferred to it. The bedrock of the crisis of statehood in Africa is the un-
resolved issue of social contract. The social contract theoretical perspective is 
concerned with political authority and legitimacy within state formations and 
is anchored on the principle of basic freedom, consent and equality (Neidle-
man 2012). 
The central element in social contract is consensus, notwithstanding 
whether the consensus is built on explicit, tacit or hypothetical consent of the 
people (Van der Waldt 2013; Neidleman 2012; Abioye 2011). Essentially, con-
sensus leading to social contract is achieved through bargaining with broad 
spectra of the polity. Thus, the essence of social contract is to legitimatise the 
basis for citizens within a state territory to “enjoy the rights and reap the ben-
efits of the social order if s/he lives by its rules and fulfils the responsibilities 
of membership” (Flanagan 1999, 135). Igwe (2002) has argued that consti-
tutional development represents a major approximation to social contract in 
contemporary state system as no state actually emerged from prior consulta-
tions akin to the classical social contract theorisation of Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau. 
National constitutions have been represented by scholars as a symbol-
isation of social contract and concrete approximation to voluntary expression 
of consent by the people within the state system (Van der Waldt 2013; Abioye 
2011; Diehl et al 2009). If this argument is taken further, it means that post-
colonial African constitutions symbolise social contract. Constitution-making 
– both in the colonial and postcolonial era - could have served the purpose 
of social contract and, thus, state-building in Africa but it is undermined by 
certain systemic shortcomings. Constitution-making in Africa, which essen-
tially adopted top-bottom strategies, only fulfilled the desires of the elite and 
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marginalised the people. Unlike the constitutions of western countries, which 
emanated from genuine pro-people platform, most African constitutions 
were parodies and lacked the credentials of representation. Thus, despite the 
insertion of phrases that pretended to confer authorship of constitutions on 
the people such as ‘we, the people...’, most African constitutions were not 
rooted in the people as most of the representatives that drafted them were im-
posed by both colonial and postcolonial governments (Abioye 2011). Postcolo-
nial constitutions were not patently designed to tackle injustice and enthrone 
socio-political and economic justice but to entrench the ruling elite. 
The disconnect between social contract and postcolonial African con-
stitutions is domiciled in the conception of state power and its utilitarian val-
ue. State power was seen from economistic prism; that is, as a tool for accu-
mulation. By extension, postcolonial constitutions were designed to preserve 
the colonial state with its legacy of state power for accumulation purposes 
(Ake 1996). This perception underpinned the personalisation and privatisa-
tion of the state and the attendant resistance that ultimately degenerated to 
various conflicts across Africa. But the personalisation of the social contract 
by the postcolonial African leaders created the neopatrimonial state that exists 
to serve the interest of the ruling class as well as their preservation. Such pres-
ervation precluded any form of regional or continental governance structure 
that could emasculate their exercise of power (Sigman and Lindberg 2017). 
From State-building to Nation-building: Ethno-identity 
Pressures and the Crisis of Statehood
 The nature of African statehood is both the root and component of the 
crisis that confronts the continent. This crisis is what has given rise to post-co-
loniality, which encapsulates the “post-colonial predicaments which African 
states have endured and continue to experience” as well as the “dilemmas of 
modernisation and the manner in which African states negotiate their way 
through complexities that have grown out of the colonial experience” (Ahl-
uwalia 2001, 1). It is not as if the crisis of statehood is a post-independence 
phenomenon; it predated independence. The crisis of statehood had its origin 
in the colonial era when Africans challenged the legitimacy of the arbitrarily 
balkanised African territories. As Okafor (2000, 31-32) observes, “it was a cri-
sis about the legitimacy of the form, organisational structure, and the behav-
iour of the state in the eyes of its component peoples.” 
 The attainment of independence in the 1960s by African states nei-
ther assuaged nor addressed the legitimacy question. Indeed, independence 
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redefined and exposed the bare contours of African statehood and intensi-
fied the contention of the centrifugal forces in them. Despite the seeming 
survival of African states, the domestic centrifugal forces have contributed 
to their near collapse and attendant development challenges. Thus, African 
states have been perennially enmeshed in the struggle for survival. The pre-
occupation of African states with survival has led to their characterisation 
as juridical states. Clapham’s (2002, 4) claim that “the evident weakness of 
African states did not reduce them to a state of inertia, in which their fate was 
determined by external powers” was not only analytically misleading but out 
of sync with the reality of the African situation. The inability of African states 
to enthrone development deepened domestic crises with continual threat to 
their sovereignty. As Ahluwalia (2001, 54) asserts, African states became en-
trapped as subjects of “new colonial administrators” made up of the World 
Bank, the IMF and a host of non-governmental organisations who determine 
and dictate their fundamental policies.
The weakness of African states made them pawns in the chessboard of 
ideological contestation in the cold war era. The artificiality and tenuousness 
of these states were made manifest when, at the end of cold war era, western 
states began to withdraw their support from the puppet-regimes across Af-
rica. Underscoring the influence of external powers in propping up regimes 
and masking the weakness of African states, Gettleman (2010) asserts, “the 
cold war’s end bred state collapse and chaos. Where meddling great powers 
once found dominoes that needed to be kept from falling, they suddenly saw 
no national interest at all”. The effect was the proliferation of conflicts as so 
many rogue groups emerged with such rapidity that governments began to 
collapse. The devastating effects of these conflicts on African development 
have been enormous. Between 1990 and 2005, it was estimated that Africa 
squandered close to US$284 billion (or US$18 billion yearly) to prosecute 
conflicts (IANSA, Oxfam and Saferworld 2007, 9).
There appears to be retrogression in the nature of statehood in Africa. 
Going by Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982) typology of empirical and juridical 
statehood, which also coincides with Jackson and Sørensen’s (2007) classifi-
cation of states into formal or legal institutions and substantial political-eco-
nomic organisations, African states seem to have degenerated from empirical 
statehood which the erstwhile imperial powers left at independence to juridi-
cal statehood in the course of time, as independent states. The distinguishing 
characteristics of empirical and juridical statehood lie in their features: while 
empirical statehood depicts states that possess the capability to protect their 
sovereignty through the functionality of their administrative and governance 
structures as well as the wherewithal to project and protect their national in-
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terest, juridical statehood signifies states that lack the basic sovereign author-
ity and power to exclusively impose its will both on its territorial space and in 
the international arena (Akude 2009; Jackson and Sørensen 2007; Jackson 
and Rosberg 1982).  
  The degeneration of postcolonial African states to juridical statehood 
is a product of the inability of the emergent African leaders to fully under-
stand the role of the state. This distortion in the role of the state manifested at 
three levels: at the first level, the elite converted the state into a means of accu-
mulation and the state was unable to manage ethnic diversity. As Ake (1981, 
126) affirms, “the massive intervention of the state in the economic sphere 
and the use of political power as the means of appropriation distorts (sic) the 
role of the capitalist state in Africa”. At the second level, the arbitrariness that 
characterised the composition of most African states and their multiethnic 
character provided the environment for the explosion of primeval sentiments. 
Although scholars hold divergent positions about the relationship between 
ethnic diversity and conflict (Bleaney and Dimico 2017), postcolonial African 
leaders have often exploited the diversity in ethnic composition to achieve 
parochial political and economic objectives including conflicts (Green 2011; 
Ukiwo 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja 1999; Ake 1981). The primeval sentiments 
are normally mobilised to ensure victory in intra-and inter-elite rivalry for 
political ascendancy. At the third and last level was the increasing predilection 
toward the homogenisation of the intra-state differences. This consisted of 
attempts to paper over the diversity in the state by making one nation out of 
multiple nations that make most African states (Okafor 2000). This attempt 
spawned the ground for the pockets of conflicts across Africa.
After the supervised elections that produced the first crop of postco-
lonial African leaders, which Onimode (1983) insists coincided with the in-
terest of the retreating imperial powers, the task of state-building changed to 
nation-building. Although concepts of “state-building” and “nation-building” 
are used interchangeably, they have different connotations. Nation-building is 
conceived in ethnic, cultural, historical or political sense and denotes actions 
undertaken to mobilise and forge a common sense of nationhood in a mul-
ti-national setting.  Nation-building is often undertaken to counter alternate 
sources of identity and loyalty.  State-building, on the other hand, comprises 
purpose-driven actions of the ruling elite or national actors directed at in-
creasing and strengthening the capacity and capability of the state to carry out 
its statutory responsibilities (OECD 2008).
In the post-independence era, the emergent African leaders enacted 
their own form of “divide and rule” strategy as they relied on primordial ties 
as basis for solidarity and retention of political powers. In other words, in-
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stead of diversity being managed and converted into a source of strength and 
opportunity for development, it became the Achilles heel of intra-state inte-
gration. It was not an accident, but part of the survival strategies of the elite to 
hold on to power, which was and still is, central in the matrix of accumulation. 
Across Africa, the ruling elite promoted ethnicity, religious affiliations and 
other group identifiers as basis of primary allegiance. In Nigeria, for example, 
not only did the emergent leaders root their political platforms in their eth-
nic regions, they professed the unworkability of the Nigerian state as the late 
Obafemi Awolowo described it as a mere geographical expression and Tafawa 
Balewa (Nigeria’s first Prime Minister), as an intention of Britain and its colo-
nial policy (Coleman 1986; Uzoigwe 1999). Even in states like Somalia with 
one ethnic group and religion, the forces of ethnicity, in the form of “clan fac-
tions,” played detrimental roles that culminated in its “its complete political 
and economic failure as a state” (Loubser and Solomon 2014, 1).
The deployment of the ethnic card by Africa ruling elite led to the 
distortion and retreat of the state and its democratic credentials. In place of 
people-oriented government anchored on multi-partyism, the state moved to-
wards one-party system, thus becoming a replica of the colonial state that had 
been overthrown (Kadima 2006). Berman (1998, 305) identifies the essen-
tial features of these states as “bureaucratic authoritarianism, pervasive pa-
tron-client relations and complex ethnic dialectics of assimilation, fragmen-
tation and competition”. The reaction to the personalisation of the state was 
the enthronement of the psychology of resistance by those who believed they 
had been marginalised. Ethnic politics across African states also created the 
crisis of citizenship. As Manby (2009, 1-2) asserts, “...questions of citizenship 
have been used to prevent specific individuals from challenging for political 
position or to silence those who criticize the government.” For instance, such 
personalities as Kenneth Kaunda, former president of Zambia and Alassane 
Ouattara, former prime minister of Côte d’Ivoire, were among politicians 
who found themselves excluded from office or denied citizenship on account 
of seemingly absurd arguments about their ancestral origins.
Most of the intra-state conflicts originated from ethnic nationalism 
targeted at resisting domestic imperialism. The cost of conflicts has been 
enormous, ranging from the depletion of human resources necessary for de-
velopment, the retardation of chances of development to fragile state system 
incapable of undertaking state functions. World-wide estimates of conflict-re-
lated deaths between 1960 and 2005 were put at 6.6 million. Out of this 
number, Africa accounted for 1.6 million or 24 percent (AfDB 2008). The 
preoccupation of African states with issues of state-survival underpins the 
lack of meaningful progress in the area of continent-wide integration.
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African Union, State Fragility and the Contradictions of State-
hood
The AU (formerly OAU) has been in existence for the past fifty-five 
years having emerged from the deep introspective recognition of African uni-
ty as basis for relevance in the global arena. In theorising about uniting Af-
rican states to form a political leviathan, post-independence African leaders 
took it as given that the states created by the Europeans could be relied upon 
to build continental political edifice. Thus, the then OAU, (now AU) through 
a resolution of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government in 1964 
adopted the existing colonial boundaries and did not push for their renegotia-
tion as basis for the quest for continental unity (Okafor 2000; Manby 2009). 
Although African states were decreed into existence to satisfy Eu-
ropean interests, namely the quest for politico-economic ascendancy, ad-
vancement of their economic interest, the maintenance of the psychological 
make-belief of imperial relevance and quest for power, it was contended by 
African leaders that readjusting the inherited colonial boundaries would be 
counter-productive as it had the potentiality of leading to avoidable conflicts 
(Ahluwalia 2001). Some scholars rationalised the position of AU (then OAU) 
on colonial boundaries on three grounds, namely, pragmatic reasons; ideolog-
ical reasons; and political rationality and contended that the justification for 
AU’s line of action then lay in the near-absence of inter-state conflicts (Ahlu-
walia 2001; Okafor 2000). 
The contemporary fragility associated with African states originated 
from the evolutionary crystallisation of the contradictions of colonial state-
hood and therefore, calls to question the historical decision of AU in 1964 to 
retain colonial boundaries. Indeed, that decision reflected a serious contradic-
tion that is difficult to situate. The then OAU was a product of compromise 
that attempted to harmonise the extreme positions of the Brazzaville, Cas-
ablanca and Monrovia groups, which oscillated between immediate setting 
up of United States of Africa with African Central Government (ACG) and 
gradualism based on forging continental unity after state consolidation (Wil-
liams 2007; Igwe 2002; Ibeike-Jonah 2001). The emergence of OAU was a 
tacit renunciation of the proposition for ACG. Thus, the most natural path 
for OAU given its major objectives, especially the promotion of unity and 
solidarity among African states and eradication of all forms of colonialism on 
the continent, would have been to work towards re-examining statehood from 
the perspective of colonial boundaries as a means to removing the basis for 
future tensions (Laumann 2012). 
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Paradoxically, this policy failure led to the consequence which the then 
OAU leadership had intended to avoid, namely conflicts. As Ahluwalia (2001, 
69) avers, “the [OAU], whilst recognising that inherited borders were prob-
lematic, feared endless conflicts over them and decided that these Europe-
an-drawn borders were to remain uncontested”. But, having focused on fear 
of inter-state conflicts, its inaction on state territoriality inadvertently spawned 
a different sort of conflicts - internal conflicts - with devastating consequences 
on statehood (Gbenenye 2016; Manby 2009; Okafor 2000). Even some of 
the internal wars developed the character of inter-state war. For instance, the 
crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was an offshoot of citizen-
ship crisis that started at independence but crystallised in 1964 when the first 
constitution set parameters for citizenship, which potentially denationalised 
some segments of the country, especially the Banyarwanda populations. As 
Manby (2009, 8) has observed, “those excluded by these laws form the core of 
the rebel groups that have challenged central authority since the late 1990s”.
State fragility appears to be descriptively denotative of postcolonial Af-
rican states although such countries as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Hai-
ti, and Kosovo among others are situated within this categorisation (OECD 
2012). There is no agreement among scholars about the impact of colonialism 
on fragility of African states, especially because of lack of homogeneity in co-
lonial policies of erstwhile imperial powers, the nature of colonial settlement 
and the duration of colonial rule. Thus, while some studies found correlation 
between colonialism and contemporary fragility of African states (Ziltener 
and Kunzler 2013), others found no such relationship (Tusalem 2016; Bertoc-
chi & Guerzon 2012).
There appears to be no real analytical demarcation between such con-
cepts as “failed state”, “collapsed state” or “fragile state”. They all depict a state 
that is in various forms of distress, characterized by the breakdown of law 
and order as well as loss of political and administrative capacity to govern and 
oversee the efficient distribution of public goods and services (Tusalem 2016). 
Notwithstanding the problem of analytic impreciseness, these concepts yield 
certain regular meanings that fall within the capacity of a state to satisfy is-
sues bordering on security, the provision of basic services, and the protection 
of essential civil freedoms (Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein 2005). State fra-
gility coincides with the loss of empirical statehood and descent to juridical 
statehood. OECD (2007) follows this trend when it defined state fragility in 
terms of “state structures lack[ing] political will and/or capacity to provide the 
basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard 
the security and human rights of their populations.” The onset of fragility 
in African states is traced to independence. As Okafor (2000, 34) puts it, “... 
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the post-colonial African state has been crisis-ridden virtually since the very 
moment of its independence. ... The moment of independence was for many 
African states also at once the moment of crisis.” During the 1960s, there 
were seven episodes of conflict involving Democratic Republic of Congo, Su-
dan (first war), Rwanda, Ethiopia (in Eritrea), Burundi (1965), Nigeria (Bia-
fra), and Equatorial Guinea (Strauss 2012). A common shortcoming in the 
various definitional boundaries of state fragility is their discountenance of the 
unequal global system as part of the identifying parameters of fragile states.
Prior to OAU’s transformation to AU in 2001, the conclusion of schol-
ars and leaders was that even though it did commendable work in mobilising 
and championing the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid cause, it failed abysmal-
ly in consolidating Africa’s political and economic independence (Ibeike-Jo-
nah 2001).  The disconnect between OAU’s avowed objectives and actual per-
formance prompted Julius Nyerere to describe it as a forum where African 
leaders convened once a year to pass ineffective resolutions (cited in Bekerie 
2001). The seeming ineffectiveness of OAU was attributed to the “personal-
istic, materialistic and opportunistic character of African politics” (Berman 
1998, 305). There were other reasons too: the first was the primacy of political 
power in the calculation of the elite. The fact that political power was a visa of 
sorts to economic wellbeing through accumulation made its relinquishment 
for continental unity difficult (Ake 1981). Second, most African leaders were 
not products of democratic process and thus couldn’t care less about African 
unity (Ibeike-Jonah 2001). Third, there were varying political and ideologi-
cal pretensions and divisions that stoked distrust and, thus, undermined at-
tempts at building a formidable continental organisation.  Lastly, there was 
overbearing influence of the erstwhile imperial powers through the division 
of Africa into Anglophone and Francophone geo-economic and geopolitical 
zones (Bekerie 2001). 
Reinventing the AU for the Exorcism of the Spectre of State 
Fragility and Failure
The transformation of OAU to AU in July 2001 was a direct response 
to the shortcomings of OAU and the need to strengthen it to meet the chal-
lenges of globalisation. The AU differs significantly from OAU in a number 
of ways: one, it professes respect for democratic principles and denounces 
non-democratic methods of changing governments; two, it reduces the bar on 
non-interference in the internal affairs of all member states; three, it accords 
itself the responsibility to protect by making provisions for collective action 
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in grave circumstances such as wars, genocide and crimes against humani-
ty; four, legitimate governments could request for intervention if it is under 
threat of military coup d’état; and lastly, it sets up good governance institu-
tions such as common parliament, Central Bank and a court of justice mod-
elled after the European Union (Okhonmina 2009; Williams 2007; Packer 
and Rukare 2002; Ibeike-Jonah 2001).
As at the time AU came on board, almost every part of Africa was 
embroiled in varying degrees of political, economic and security challenges. 
The ensembles of state fragility do not just comprise the incapacity of the 
state to provide the conducive environment for development but extends to 
the nature of the global economic system, especially the peripheral status of 
African states. It could not be by accident that all states categorised as frag-
ile states are countries of the periphery with colonial foundations (Tusalem 
2016; OECD 2012). As has already been noted, the overbearing influence and 
meddlesomeness of the developed countries in African states had sustained 
dictatorial regimes before the “third wave of democratisation” and continues 
to dictate policy directions. All the questionable leaders and dictators in Africa 
from Idi Amin of Uganda, Jean-Bedel Bokassa of Central African Republic to 
Mobutu Sese Seko of DRC were originally the product of this support. The 
end of the Cold War with the withdrawal of western support exposed these 
governments as many of them, from Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR-C), became 
theatres of diverse forms of intra-state violence.
The greatest problem facing the AU is how to break the fragility trap 
in Africa. The Malian case has also provided a twist about how easily a country 
could switch from stability to fragility (OECD 2012). Before the military coup 
d’état that plunged Mali into crisis, the country was showcased as an epitome 
of democratic consolidation having held repeated elections (Kim 2013). State 
fragility in Africa is a product of internal and external factors. Internal factors 
include ethno-religious crises, terrorism, poverty, corruption, political intoler-
ance, inoperative or weak enforcement of the rule of law and political insta-
bility spawned by political desperation among others. At the external level are 
such factors as the unfavourable global capitalist system, small arms and light 
weapons proliferation, iron-tight hold of erstwhile imperial powers on their 
former colonies as exemplified by the pattern of economic regionalisation and 
proxy wars.
The continued relevance of AU is dependent on its capacity to disman-
tle the various impediments to efficient operations. Granted that, on paper, 
the AU possesses the institutional facilities to handle security challenges, the 
question is: does it have the capacity to pull it off? Based on the experience 
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of the Arab Spring, particularly the Libyan crisis and the Malian conflict, the 
answer might be in the negative. The various institutions set up by the AU, 
especially the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which entered into force on 
26 December 2003, represent the broad security architecture to secure peace 
in Africa. The PSC and other institutions within the AU such as the African 
Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the 
Panel of the Wise (PW), “are meant to deliver comprehensive peace to the 
continent as they are ‘home grown initiatives that are meant to put the desti-
ny of the continent into the hands of the African people’” (Kasaija 2013, 121). 
The effectiveness of AU is dependent on certain critical factors, espe-
cially the full and proactive support of its membership. As appealing as the 
AU maxim of “African solution to African problems,” might appear, it would 
degenerate to mere sloganeering in the absence of requisite tools to effect 
the solution. As the Libyan and Malian conflicts demonstrated, the AU lacks 
the requisite tools to independently deal with crises on the continent. With 
respect to the Libyan crisis, AU’s indecisiveness created room for both the 
United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to pay 
more attention to the position of the Arab League and other organisations. 
The AU, despite its avowed commitment to the notion of ‘non-indifference’, 
neither intervened, threatened to intervene nor imposed any form of sanction 
on Libya, no matter how symbolic, throughout the nine-month period of the 
Libyan conflict (Kasaija 2013). As a matter of fact, the AU was sharply divided 
with some countries either recognising the rebels or sitting on the fence. 
Security challenges are not the only triggers and drivers of state fragil-
ity. Socio-economic issues, especially deprivation of access to means of live-
lihood, either through skewed and detrimental state policies or from such 
causes as climate change, are as potent drivers as armed conflicts in plung-
ing a state into the ranks of fragile states. The pervasive poverty and hun-
ger across Africa are not only major contributors to its fragility but also its 
outcome. In 2010, about 239 million people in Africa were categorized as 
being undernourished (FAO 2010). By 2016, there was further deterioration. 
According to FAO et al, (2016, 11), Africa had the “highest levels of severe 
food insecurity, reaching 27.4 percent of the population – almost four times 
that of any other region in 2016,” meaning that more than 243 million people 
in Africa did not have access to sufficient food energy. Similarly, the United 
Nations estimates put the number of people living in extreme poverty in 2008 
at 386 million (United Nation 2012). Added to the foregoing are the data on 
internal and supranational displacements. In 2011, the proportion African 
people categorized as comprising “population of concern” to UNHCR was put 
at 13.5 million. By 2016, this number had increased to 19.6 million, mainly 
as a result of the exacerbation of conflicts and conflict zones in Africa.  The 
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concept of “population of concern to UNHCR” is used to refer to refugees, 
asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and 
IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR (UNHCR 2012; 
2016).What all these statistics suggest is that there is serious task ahead of 
AU if it must be relevant in reversing the trend of state fragility in Africa. 
The five-step strategy enunciated by Jim Yong Kim, the president of 
the World Bank Group, to help fragile states get back on the path of recovery 
is instructive.  Kim (2013) enumerated the steps to include understanding 
the drivers of fragility and conflict; delivering faster, more flexible and timely 
assistance; quick wins, that is, the quest to achieve early results in order to 
win public trust in building institutions while also focusing on the long term 
goals; provision of jobs and more jobs to help break the cycle of poverty and 
violence; and setting in motion coordinated, rather than disjointed, develop-
ment assistance. Kasaija (2013) has pointed out that the problems facing the 
AU consisted of division among AU members, financial constraints and in-
stitutional incapacity. Emphasizing the disconnect between proclamation and 
reality in terms of the capacity of AU to intervene militarily in disputes, Ka-
saija (2013, 122) observes that the thinking behind the African Standby Force 
(ASF) is to have a peacekeeping force capable of rapid deployment in pursuit 
of AU, UN mandate, but “since it was first mooted in July 2002, the ASF has 
been a work in progress”.
Conclusion
State fragility appears to be the most daunting challenge to Africa. Fra-
gility is not the cause of Africa’s development crisis but rather the manifesta-
tion of the incapacity of African states to discharge their stately functions. The 
roots of fragility were firmly planted when the emergent post-independence 
African leaders declined to re-draw the boundaries of the colonial states they 
inherited. Added to this was the privatisation of the state through the instru-
mentality of ethnicity. 
State-building and state fragility are opposite sides of the same coin. 
As a matter of fact, what is needed to reverse state fragility is a robust and 
result-oriented state-building. The relevance of AU in driving the reversal of 
state fragility lies in increasing its capability. As it is, there is a serious discon-
nect between the avowed objectives of AU and its capability to actualise them. 
The challenge which AU faces in facilitating state-building and thus end state 
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ABSTRACT
This article evaluates the transformational role of the African Union (AU) in 
enhancing state-building and reversing the fragility of African states. Essentially, the 
AU was repackaged in July 2001 as a strategic platform to meet new aspirations for 
African unity and development. This article notes that after over half a century of 
collective African attempt at strengthening its state system, the picture is still one 
of fragile statehood, thus emphasizing the imperative of evolving new strategies 
to reverse the forces of state fragility in the continent. The article contends that 
in the face of concerns for African development within the context of sustainable 
development goals (SDGs), a healthy and functional state system is an irreducible 
minimum requirement. In order to repair the seemingly battered image of statehood 
in Africa, the AU must contend with, and overcome, the interplay of internal and 
external forces that conduce to and trigger fragility.
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